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GARCIA-MIR V. MEESE: REAFFIRMING THE
INDEFINITE DETENTION OF ALIENS IN THE 1980s
Randy Toledo*
INTRODUCTION
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit once again has
strengthened the authority of the federal government to detain excluda-
ble aliens1 indefinitely for violating United States immigration laws. In
Garcia-Mir v. Meese,2 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
reaffirmed earlier court decisions permitting the federal government to
detain excludable aliens indefinitely.3 The court of appeals rejected
claims asserting that excludable Cuban aliens held in detention possess
a nonconstitutionally based liberty interest entitling them to parole rev-
ocation hearings. In addition, the court of appeals concluded that in
* J.D. Candidate, 1988, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 578 n.2 (1 th Cir. 1984) (distin-
guishing excludable from deportable aliens). The term "excludable" refers to aliens
seeking admission either outside United States territory or at the border before initial
entry, whereas "deportable" refers to aliens who are in the United States regardless of
the legality of their entry. Id.; see also Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 US. 185, 187
(1957) (distinguishing between "expulsion" proceedings, which apply to deportable
aliens, and "exclusion" proceedings). This distinction is important because immigration
law confers greater rights and privileges on aliens who enter the United States irrespec-
tive of the legality of their entry. Compare 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1230 (1982) (describing
the procedures for removing excludable aliens from United States territory) with 8
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1260 (1982) (describing the procedures for the removal of deportable
aliens from United States territory); see also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32
(1982) (recognizing that deportable aliens have constitutional protections because they
have effected an entry).
2. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ferrer-
Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
3. Id.; see Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(d)(4) (1982) (enumerating the grounds of exclusion). Aliens are excludable or
excluded from the United States if they fall into one of numerous categories. Id.
Among the categories of exclusion are: aliens lacking documents or proper documenta-
tion, id. § 1182(a)(21), aliens having physical or mental disabilities or defects, id. §
1182 (a)(I)-(4), (6), (7) (defining the physical and mental disorders that the statute
contemplates), and aliens who are criminals or have admitted committing a crime of
moral turpitude. Id. § 1182(a)(9), (10) (1982).
4. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (1 th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986); see Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734
F.2d 576, 581-82 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the proposition that the right to parole
revocation hearings is a core value of the due process clause per se and applicable to
unadmitted aliens). The Cuban aliens in this litigation sought a constitutionally based
liberty interest in the hearings. Id. The circuit court denied the parole revocation hear-
ings, holding that parole is part of the admission process and excludable aliens have no
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light of a controlling executive act, international legal principles
prohibiting prolonged arbitrary detention did not apply to the Cuban
aliens.5
The excludable Cuban aliens in Garcia-Mir v. Meese have chal-
lenged the legality of their detention since their arrival in the United
States during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift.8 The most significant outcome
of the Garcia-Mir decision is the finding that the aliens have exhausted
their claims in the federal judiciary. The court stated that these cases
had reached a terminal point and would be dismissed. 8 Consequently,
these Mariel Cubans will face indefinite detention beyond the seven
years some of them have already spent behind the bars of a maximum
security federal penitentiary.
This Note offers alternatives for a more equitable solution to the
problem of indefinitely detaining excludable aliens. Part I reviews
United States immigration law and policy regarding excludable aliens.
Part II chronicles the events leading to the Cuban exodus in 1980 and
the arrival of the Cuban aliens who the United States government
found excludable and subsequently detained. Part III summarizes the
court's analysis in Garcia-Mir v. Meese. Part IV evaluates the legal
issues the court addressed and offers alternative interpretations of the
law. Part V concludes with suggested alternatives to the use of indefi-
nite incarceration.
I. THE EXCLUDABILITY OF ALIENS UNDER UNITED
STATES IMMIGRATION LAWS
A. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO RESTRICT ENTRY OF ALIENS INTO
THE UNITED STATES
The United States generally did not restrict early immigration to the
United States.9 In the early 1800s, however, states imposed restrictions
and limitations on immigrants.' 0 Then, in 1875, the United States Su-
constitutional right to be admitted to the United States. Id. at 581-82.
5. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1454 (1Ith Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986); see RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702(e) comment h (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1985) (stating that prolonged arbitrary detention violates international law).
6. See infra note 86 (discussing the detained aliens' seven year history of judicial
challenges to their continued incarceration).
7. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1455 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
8. Id.
9. W. BROMWELL, HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 199-205
(1856).
10. See id. (noting state imposed restrictions on paupers, criminals, and lunatics).
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preme Court recognized the exclusive nature of congressional power to
restrict immigration."' The Court viewed congressional power over im-
migration as an extension of the federal power over foreign com-
merce. 1 2 The plenary power of Congress over immigration became well
established.13 Early federal restrictions on immigration included
prohibitions against the admission of convicts and prostitutes.14 With
the advent of the Chinese Exclusion Act,15 Congress asserted its ple-
nary power over immigration to impose qualitative restrictions on im-
migrants.16 Subsequent legislation restricted the admission of lunatics,
idiots, and those likely to become public charges.
17
In response to the growing number of aliens entering the United
States, Congress adopted additional restrictions on aliens entering the
country. 8 In The Chinese Exclusion Case,"' the Supreme Court ex-
11. Henderson v. City of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 274 (1875) (declaring that state
restrictions on immigration are unconstitutional infringements of federal power).
12. Id.
13. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (recognizing
that the political branches of the federal government have plenary authority to estab-
lish and implement rules governing the admission of aliens). This power arises from an
accepted maxim of international law that the power to control admission of foreigners
is an inherent attribute of national sovereignty. Id.; see also United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (discussing congressional and execu-
tive power to exclude aliens as a "fundamental act of sovereignty"); U.S. CoNsT. art. I,
§ 8 (granting Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations). The
Constitution also expressly conveys to Congress the power to legislate in the area of
naturalization. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8 (allowing Congress to "establish an uniform rule
of naturalization"). The Constitution, however, does not directly address the subject of
immigration.
14. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477, 477-78 (current version at 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9), (10), (12) (1982)) (barring convicts and prostitutes from admis-
sion).
15. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, § 1, 22 Stat. 58, 58-59 (suspending the immigra-
tion of Chinese laborers for 10 years and prohibiting the Chinese from becoming
United States citizens), repealed by Chinese Exclusion Repeal Act, ch. 344, § 1, 57
Stat. 600, 600-01 (1943).
16. 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.2b
(1986). Restrictions focused on the quality of the immigrant, including health and
morals. Id. Later, political philosophy became a qualitative restriction. See Act of
March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 38, 32 Stat. 1213, 1221 (current version at 8 U.S.C. §
l182(a)(28)(A) (1982)) (excluding anarchists).
17. Act of February 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 2, 39 Stat. 874, 875-76 (current version at 8
U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(2), (3), (9), (12), (15) (1982)) (excluding idiots, lunatics, convicts,
prostitutes, and people likely to become public charges).
18. See, e.g., Act of February 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 877 (current
version at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(25) (1982)) (imposing a literacy requirement for admis-
sion); Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 1, 26 Stat. 1084, 1084 (current version at 8
U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(6), (8), (9), (11) (1982)) (excluding persons suffering from danger-
ous contagious diseases, paupers, polygamists, and those individuals convicted of crimi-
nal offenses involving moral turpitude); Act of August 3, 1882, ch. 376, § 1, 22 Stat.
214, 214 (imposing a head tax on immigrants) (repealed 1966); see also Head Money
Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 591-95 (1884) (upholding taxation of immigrants as a valid exer-
19871 655
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panded the federal power in immigration beyond regulation of foreign
commerce and recognized the power to exclude aliens as an incident of
sovereignty.20 Congress later codified restrictions on entry into the
United States in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
(INA).2
B. THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT OF 1952: ExCLUSION
AND PAROLE
The INA and its subsequent amendments codify United States im-
migration law.22 The INA delineates several categories for exclusion:
1) improper application for entry; 2) personal qualifications; and 3)
misconduct.23 These exclusion categories bar aliens from entry into the
United States.24 The INA grants the executive branch the power to
impose additional entry restrictions on classes of aliens when the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS) deems their entry detrimen-
tal to the United States.25 The Act also permits the INS to waive
grounds for exclusion in the case of refugees.2" The INA, however, lim-
its this exception to waivers related to labor certificates, public charges,
documents, literacy, and graduates of foreign medical schools.27
The INA provides that the United States government should imme-
diately deport an excludable alien arriving in United States territory to
the country from where he or she came and on the vessel or aircraft on
which he or she arrived.28 The INA only tangentially mentions detain-
ing excludable aliens in a provision requiring that the government
charge the owner of the vessel or aircraft that transported the alien to
cise of congressional power to regulate commerce with foreign nations).
19. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
20. Id. at 606-09 (holding that the power to exclude aliens is a sovereign power
under the Constitution and observing that legislative action binds the judiciary); see
also Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) (dictum) (stating that
the inherent power of a sovereign nation to exclude aliens is essential to self-
preservation).
21. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1982).
22. See 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 16, § 1.3a (stating that al-
though repeatedly amended, the INA remains the basic immigration and nationality
law).
23. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1982) (detailing the categories for excluding aliens).
24. See C. GORDON & E.G. GORDON, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW §
2.27 (1985) (stating that some exclusions bar the alien's entry to the United States
permanently).
25. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 212(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (1982).
26. C. GORDON & E.G. GORDON, supra note 24, § 2.22A.
27. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 212(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (1982).
28. Id. § 1227(a)(1).
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the United States for detention expenses. 29 Before the INS deports the
excludable alien, the INS must provide an exclusion proceeding to de-
termine the alien's admissibility.30 An immigration judge presides over
the exclusion proceeding and the judge's decision is final, unless the
alien appeals to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).31 The BIA
determination of excludability results in an exclusion order.32
The excludable alien may delay deportation in two ways. First, the
alien may seek a stay of deportation by either appealing the immigra-
tion judge's decision and order,33 or requesting a stay from the INS
district director who has the discretion to grant such requests.3 Sec-
ond, the alien may challenge the exclusion order through habeas corpus
proceedings, 5 the sole means of challenging an exclusion order.30 To
bring a challenge against an exclusion order, an alien does not have to
show that he or she was restrained physically. 7 Although the tradi-
29. Id.
30. Id. § 1226(a) (1982); see 8 C.F.R. § 236.2 (1986) (explaining the exclusion
proceeding); see also C. GORDON & E.G. GORDON, supra note 24, §§ 3.15-3.17(f)
(explaining the procedures involved in exclusion hearings). Unless otherwise requested,
the exclusion proceeding is closed to the public. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (1982); 8 C.F.R. §
236.2(a) (1986). The alien has the right to representation by counsel. Id. At the exclu-
sion hearing, the immigration judge will review evidence and rule on objections. Id. §
236.2(b). The hearing is recorded. Id. § 236.2(e). The immigration judge determines
whether the alien should enter the United States or be excluded and deported. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a) (1982).
If the immigration official orders deportation, the alien may appeal to the Attorney
General. Id. § 1226(b). An appeal serves as a stay of any final order until the Attorney
General renders his or her decision. Id. The Attorney General bases his or her decision
on the recorded evidence produced at the exclusion hearing. Id. Unless the Attorney
General reverses the immigration official's decision, the exclusion order is final. Id. §
1226(c).
31. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 236(a)-(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)-(c)
(1982).
32. See C. GORDON & E.G. GORDON, supra note 24, § 3.18(b) (stating that the
immigration judge issues the exclusion order with the decision of inadmissibility).
33. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 236(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b)
(1982).
34. 8 C.F.R. § 237.1 (1986) (providing that the district director has the discretion
to grant stays of deportation).
35. Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, § 106(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1105(b)
(1982).
36. Id. (stating that a habeas corpus proceeding is the only way for an alien to
challenge an exclusion order).
37. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 236-44 (1963) (holding that habeas
corpus is available after release on parole). The Court suggests that petitioners may use
the writ of habeas corpus to test the legality of a given restraint on liberty. Id. at 238-
44. Courts need not restrict such restraint to situations in which the applicant is in
actual, physical custody. Id. at 239: The Court concluded that the writ applies to situa-
tions of constructive restraint after examining the common law usages of the writ. Id.
at 238-39. The Court illustrates constructive restraint through the case of Rex v. Dela-
val, 3 Burr. 1434, 97 Eng. Rep. 913 (K.B. 1763), where a master assigned an inden-
1987]
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tional rule of habeas corpus requires a showing of physical restraint,
the United States Supreme Court has expanded the application of
habeas corpus proceedings to incorporate constructive restraint. 8
As an alternative to detention pending deportation, the Attorney
General has the sole authority to grant parole 39 when the circum-
stances dictate its use.40 Conversely, the Attorney General may revoke
parole if he or she determines that the circumstances no longer warrant
its use.4' Parole allows aliens to enter the United States temporarily
until the INS determines whether the alien may remain in the coun-
try.42 The parole itself does not alter the alien's legal status.43 Parole
status merely permits the alien to remain at liberty as long as possi-
ble.44 The alien may seek judicial review of a parole decision solely for
abuse of discretion.45
tured 18 year old girl to another man "for bad purposes." Id. at 239.
38. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 239 (1963). Further extension of the con-
structive restraint doctrine could include the situation of paroled excludable aliens.
39. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5),
as amended by Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
40. Id. § 1182(d)(5) (1982) (codifying the Attorney General's authority to parole).
This section provides:
(A) The Attorney General may, except as provided in subparagraph (B), in his
discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he
may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public
interest any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of
such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the pur-
poses of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have been
served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which
he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same
manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.
Id.; see 8 C.F.R. § 212 (1986) (defining circumstances for implementing parole). This
parole authority allows the alien to join society temporarily while his or her legal status
remains at the border. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 578 n.2 (11th Cir.
1984) (referring to this outcome as the "entry fiction"); see also C. GORDON & E.G.
GORDON, supra note 24, § 2.48 (stating that in cases of delayed admissibility determi-
nations, the Attorney General has used parole as an alternative to detention).
41. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 212(d)(5)(B), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(d)(5)(B) (1982).
42. See I C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 16, § 2.54 (defining parole as
a discretionary authority that allows unadmitted aliens temporary harborage in this
country for reasons of public interest or humanity). Government authorities also have
used parole in lieu of detention while authorities review the admissibility of the alien.
Id. Parole authority is also an alternative to detention pending deportation. Id.
43. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 186 (1957) (concluding that an
alien's parole does not alter his or her status as an excludable alien or bring him or her
"within the United States" in the legal sense); see also Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1982) (providing in pertinent
part that "such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien
44. Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 186 (1957).
45. C. GORDON & E.G. GORDON, supra note 24, § 2.48.
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The INA, therefore, provides for the exclusion, deportation, and pa-
role of an alien." The alien may delay deportation through a stay of
deportation or a judicial challenge to the exclusion order.4 If the INS
paroles the alien, the alien may challenge the subsequent revocation of
parole only on a claim of abuse of discretion." Consequently, the INA
fails to expand the rights of excludable aliens beyond relief from deten-
tion through discretionary parole.
C. THE RIGHTS OF EXCLUDABLE ALIENS
Unadmitted, excludable aliens have considerably fewer rights than
deportable or resident aliens .4  As early as 1896, in Wong Wing v.
United States,5" the United States Supreme Court prevented Congress
from subjecting excludable aliens to punishment at hard labor or from
confiscating their property absent a judicial determination of guilt.5
The Court protected the property rights of excludable aliens and
granted them protection against harsh treatment in Wong Wing, but
the due process rights accorded aliens remained uncertain .
2
Subsequent cases have illustrated the unwillingness of the Supreme
Court to extend the scope of due process rights to excludable aliens.
3
46. See supra notes 30-43 and accompanying text (discussing exclusion, deporta-
tion, and parole).
47. Supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
48. Supra note 45 and accompanying text.
49. See Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 790 (D. Kan. 1980)
(noting that excludable aliens unlawfully entering the United States enjoy fewer consti-
tutional rights than other aliens), affid on other grounds, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir.
1981).
50. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
51. Id. at 237. In Wong Wing, the Supreme Court declared that to make unlawful
residence in this country an infamous crime punishable by incarceration and depriva-
tion of property, was to legislate outside the sphere of the Constitution. Id. At the same
time, the Court reaffirmed the power of Congress to detain or temporarily confine an
alien as a means to effect his or her exclusion or expulsion. Id. at 235. The Court also
recognized the power of Congress to declare an alien's illegal presence in the United
States an offense punishable by fine or imprisonment. Id.
52. See Cohen, Exclusion Vis-a-Vis Deportation Proceedings, 246 PRAc. LAW
INST. (Advanced Immigration Workshop) 347, 351 (1984) (concluding that the Su-
preme Court has not determined the due process rights of excludable aliens). The due
process rights accorded aliens remain uncertain because the amount and scope of the
protection depends on the manner of entry. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (finding that although aliens who have entered the
United States are entitled to traditional standards of due process, those who are on the
threshold of entry are in a different position).
53. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953)
(refusing to grant parole to an excludable alien despite the resulting indefinite deten-
tion); see also Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1982) (recognizing the
Attorney General's authority to detain an alien indefinitely and to deny parole without
determining the time for release).
1987] 659
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The Supreme Court decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins found that an
alien is a person under the United States Constitution. 54 The Constitu-
tion, however, does not protect all aliens in the United States. 5 Courts
have distinguished between excludable aliens, who have not effected an
entry into United States territory, and deportable aliens, who have ac-
tually entered the United States legally or otherwise.8 The Supreme
Court pronouncement in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei
illustrates this legal fiction, known as the "entry fiction." 5 In Mezei,
the Court stated that, "[i]t is true that aliens who have once passed
through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceed-
ings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due
process of law . . . [b]ut an alien on the threshold of initial entry
stands on a different footing."58
Although the courts have expanded the rights of aliens in the United
States since the early cases, excludable aliens have made little pro-
gress.5" Neither the legislature nor the courts have extended the protec-
tions the Supreme Court recognized in Wong Wing. In fact, these
branches of the federal government have prevented the expansion of
the rights of excludable aliens.60 This is evident in the Court decision in
Mezei.6 ' The INS classification of the Mariel Cubans as excludable
aliens placed them in this problematic category.
II. THE PLIGHT OF THE MARIEL CUBANS
A. EVENTS LEADING TO THE DETENTION OF THE ALIENS
Approximately 125,000 Cuban nationals 62 arrived on United States
territory in a mass exodus from Mariel Harbor in Cuba during 1980.88
54. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368-69 (1886).
55. See generally Lopez & Lopez, The Rights of Aliens in Deportation and Exclu-
sion, 20 IDAHO L. REV. 731 (1984) (discussing the legal status and diminished consti-
tutional protections afforded excludable and deportable aliens).
56. See Cohen, supra note 52, at 349 (reviewing the major decisions distinguishing
exclusion and deportation and noting Supreme Court decisions interpreting "entry");
see also Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 101(a)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(13)
(1982) (defining "entry").
57. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953).
58. Id.
59. See supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text (discussing the rights of excluda-
ble aliens).
60. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215-16 (1953)
(upholding the indefinite detention of an excludable alien on Ellis Island).
61. Id.
62. See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 539 F. Supp. 925, 928 n.4 (N.D. Ga. 1982)
(using the figure "approximately 125,000 Cubans"). The courts consistently use the
figure of 125,000 Cubans throughout the litigation in Garcia-Mir v. Meese.
63. Early in April of 1980, over 10,000 Cubans seeking refuge took over the Peru-
[VOL. 2:653
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The Cubans entered the United States without proper documentation.
The United States excluded most of the aliens because they lacked doc-
umentation.65 The United States also excluded other aliens because
they had criminal backgrounds or mental illness. 6
Immigration officials classified all the aliens as Cuban/Haitian en-
trants67 and detained them on arrival.68 The Attorney General, pursu-
vian Embassy in Havana, Cuba. Hovey, U.S. Agrees To Admit Up To 3.500 Cubans
From Peru Embassy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1980, at Al, col. 6. Western European and
Latin American countries agreed to accept these refugees and established quotas. Id.
The United States agreed to take 3,500 refugees. New York City Bar Association
Comm. on Immigration and Nationality Law, The Propriety of Detaining Asylum-
Seekers 5 (April 23, 1985) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter New York City Bar
Association Report] (stating that the United States accepted the Cuban refugees pur-
suant to the newly enacted Refugee Act of 1980). After allowing some refugees from
the Peruvian Embassy to leave for Costa Rica, the Cuban government canceled the
flights. Cuba Bars Refugee Flights to Costa Rican Staging Area, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19,
1980, at A6, col. 1. Fidel Castro subsequently announced that any individual wishing
to leave Cuba could do so through the port of Mariel. United States v. Frade, 709 F.2d
1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1983).
The mass exodus began when United States citizens traveled to Mariel Harbor with
boats to bring the refugees to the United States. Id. The Cuban government referred to
Cubans who wished to leave as "antisocial elements." N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 1980, at A2,
col. 4. Subsequently, the Cuban government began issuing travel documents to Cubans
who had not sought asylum in the Peruvian Embassy. Crendson, Cubans Arrive in Key
West; U.S. to Penalize the Flotilla, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1980, at Al, col. 2. In what
has been referred to as a presidential invitation, President Carter stated in a speech
before the League of Women Voters that the United States would "provide an open
heart and open arms" for the refugees. Weisman, President Says US. Offers 'Open
Arms' To Cuban Refugees, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1980, at Al, col. 1. The Cuban gov-
ernment took advantage of the invitation and gave criminals the option of leaving for
the United States or remaining in prison. Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 101 (4th
Cir. 1982). When United States citizens arrived at Mariel Harbor, Cuban authorities
forced them to take aboard criminals and mentally ill individuals, in addition to, or in
place of, the relatives they sought. United States v. Frade, 709 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th
Cir. 1983); see Boswell, Rethinking Exclusion-The Rights of Cuban Refugees Facing
Indefinite Detention in the United States, 17 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 925, 927-30
(1984) (detailing the chronological events surrounding the Freedom Flotilla).
64. See Boswell, supra note 63, at 934 (noting that lack of proper documentation
was the primary legal problem common to all the Cuban refugees). To gain entry, the
alien immigrant must present a passport, along with a valid immigrant visa stating that
the United States has admitted him or her. C. GORDON & E.G. GORDON, supra note
24, § 2.25a.
65. Boswell, supra note 63, at 934.
66. See supra note 3 (noting the grounds for exclusion relevant to the aliens in this
case).
67. See Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-422, § 501(e),
94 Stat. 1799, 1810 (1980) (codified at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1522 (West Supp. 1985)) (refer-
ring to the status of an "entrant"). The statute defines a "Cuban/Haitian Entrant" as:
(1) any individual granted parole status as a Cuban/Haitian Entrant (Status
Pending) or granted any other special status subsequently established under the
immigration laws for nationals of Cuba or Haiti, regardless of the status of the
individual at the time assistance or services are provided; and (2) any other na-
tional of Cuba or Haiti (A) who (i) was paroled into the United States and has
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ant to his parole authority,69 granted parole to aliens with sponsors70
The parole did not constitute a formal admission into the United States
nor did the parole change the aliens' unadmitted status.' Instead, it
permitted the Cuban aliens to reside temporarily in the United States
until the INS effected deportation proceedings against them or ad-
justed their status to permanent residence. 2
Government officials, however, denied parole to aliens who admitted
criminal backgrounds or mental illness and processed them in INS de-
tention centers around the United States.73 The INS issued final exclu-
sion orders to nearly all the detained aliens.74 Thereafter, INS agents
moved the unparoled aliens with criminal backgrounds to a maximum
security federal penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia.7 The INS detained
the aliens diagnosed as mentally ill at the INS Public Health Service
not acquired any other status under the Immigration and Nationality Act [this
chapter]; (ii) is the subject of exclusion and deportation proceedings under the
Immigration and Nationality Act [this chapter]; or (iii) has an application for
asylum pending with the Immigration and Naturalization Service; and (B) with
respect to whom a final, nonapplicable, and legally enforceable order of deporta-
tion or exclusion has riot been entered.
Id.
68. Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478, 1480 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that when
the aliens arrived, the United States government, in its discretion, denied admission to
a small percentage of the Cubans), cert. denied sub nom. Marquez-Medina v. Meese,
106 S. Ct. 1213 (1986).
69. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1982); see supra note 40 (discussing the Attorney
General's parole authority).
70. See Kneeland, U.S. Admits Problems on Refugees; 19,000 Cubans Remain in
Camps, N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1980, at A9, col. 1 (reporting that by the end of August
1980, most of the Mariel Cubans had found sponsors). A sponsor is an individual or
organization that becomes responsible for the well being of the alien and assists the
alien in finding housing, employment, and enrollment in school. Boswell, supra note 63,
at 933 n.36. Relatives in the United States sponsored some Mariel Cubans while orga-
nizations sponsored others. Id.
71. See supra note 43 (noting that parole did not constitute an admission of the
alien).
72. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 600 F. Supp. 1500, 1500 (N.D. Ga. 1985), rev'd
sub nom. Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom.
Marquez-Medina v. Meese, 106 S. Ct. 1213 (1986); see C. GORDON & E.G. GORDON,
supra note 24, § 7.4 (stating that immigration officials will adjust an alien's status for a
legitimate reason after the original purpose for his or her temporary admission ends).
In the case of refugees, a special procedure, which simulates the initial entry process,
allows aliens physically present in the United States for one year to acquire permanent
residence status. Id. § 7.7a.
73. New York City Bar Association Report, supra note 63, at 5-6.
74. Id. at 6; see Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478, 1480 (11th Cir. 1985) (stat-
ing that the INS has issued final exclusion orders to virtually all of the detained aliens,
but Cuba has refused to allow them to return), cert. denied sub nom. Marquez-Medina
v. Meese, 106 S. Ct. 1213 (1986).
75. New York City Bar Association Report, supra note 63, at 6.
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(INS/PHS) facility at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, D.C.7"
Subsequently, the INS allowed the paroled alien participants in the
Mariel Boatlift to adjust their status to permanent residence.77 The de-
tained aliens were ineligible for this adjustment of status. 8
After the boatlift, the United States government was confronted with
the dilemma of coping with both the detained aliens and the aliens
whose parole was revoked.7 9 In 1981, the government implemented the
Attorney General's Status Review Plan (Plan) to facilitate parole deci-
sions for the aliens remaining in detention. 80 The Plan established a
review panel to determine whether to grant parole to the detainees and
76. Banos v. Crosland, No. 80-2677 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 1980). The facilities at Saint
Elizabeth's Hospital are similar to a prison, with an orientation toward detention and
away from treatment. Boswell, supra note 63, at 944 n.82. Although the facility em-
ploys doctors and social workers, the detainees receive only limited treatment. Id.
While some detainees once feigned illness to get transferred to the INS/PHS facility,
other detainees requested transfer to the Atlanta prison. Id.
77. 49 Fed. Reg. 46,212 (Nov. 23, 1984) (stating that immigration officials would
adjust aliens' status pursuant to the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966); see also Cuban
Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, § 1, 80 Stat. 1161, 1161 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1255 (1982)) (providing for the adjustment of the status of "any alien who is
a native or citizen of Cuba and who has been inspected and admitted or paroled into
the United States ... and has been physically present in the United States for at least
two years. . . "). Adjustment to permanent status refers to changing an alien's tempo-
rary (non-immigrant) status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent resi-
dence. C. GORDON & E.G. GORDON, supra note 24, § 7.6a.
78. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (1982)
(authorizing the Attorney General to grant permanent resident status to aliens in the
United States who were permitted to enter temporarily). Note that the Attorney Gen-
eral may adjust the status of admitted aliens. The Mariel Cubans are unadmitted
aliens.
79. See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115, 1140-41 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
(outlining the parole, detention, release, and revocation procedures used after the initial
arrival of the Mariel Cubans), rev'd, 734 F.2d 576 (11th Cir. 1984).
80. See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 579 (1Ith Cir. 1984) (stating
that the Attorney General adopted the Status Review Plan). The Plan established a
review panel composed of officials from different divisions of the Department of Justice.
Id. The panel examined the files of each detainee to determine whether the alien was
(1) presently a nonviolent person, (2) likely to remain nonviolent, and (3) unlikely to
commit any criminal offenses after release. Id. If the alien met these criteria, the panel
recommended parole to the INS Commissioner. Id. If the panel could not make a de-
termination based solely on the records, or if the Commissioner rejected the recommen-
dation for parole, the panel personally interviewed the detainee. Id. At the interview, a
person of the detainee's choice could accompany the alien and examine his or her files
and submit written or oral information supporting his or her release. Id.
After the interview, the panel made a recommendation to the Commissioner, who
could grant parole and impose whatever special conditions he deemed appropriate, or
deny parole. Id. If the Commissioner denied parole, the Plan provided for an annual
review as long as the alien remained incarcerated. Id.; cf. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith,
622 F. Supp. 887, 891 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (questioning the adequacy of the Plan because
it established a three person panel for 1,800 detained Cubans), rev'd sub nom. Garcia-
Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ferrer-Mazorra v.
Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
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whether to impose special conditions on that parole.8 1 The ultimate de-
cision to grant parole, however, remained within the discretion of the
INS Commissioner.82
While paroled aliens moved in and out of United States detention
centers and halfway houses, Cuba refused to take back any of the
Mariel Cubans.83 A breakthrough occurred on December 14, 1984,
however, when the United States and Cuba reached an agreement for
the return of 2,746 Mariel Cubans. 4 In July 1985, however, the Cuban
government reneged on the agreement to accept the return of the de-
tained aliens.
85
B. THE JUDICIAL CHALLENGE TO DETENTION
Despite the lengthy history of legal battles86 challenging the author-
81. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 579 (11th Cir. 1984).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 578; Boswell, supra note 63, at 947 n.95.
84. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 600 F. Supp. 1500, 1501 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (ex-
plaining the December 14, 1984 agreement between Cuba and the United States re-
garding the return of the Mariel Cubans), rev'd sub nom. Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766
F.2d 1478 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Marquez-Medina v. Meese, 106 S.
Ct. 1213 (1986).
85. See Miami Herald, July 12, 1985, at A5, col. 4 (reporting that Cuba backed
out of the agreement for the return of 2,746 Mariel Cubans in response to the airing of
Radio-Marti, a Voice of America-type radio program aimed at audiences in Cuba).
86. The procedural history of this case is long and complex. It spans a period of five
years and includes several actions before the present appeal.
In January 1981, Moises Garcia-Mir, a Mariel Cuban detained at the federal peni-
tentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas filed a class action complaint in federal court in Kan-
sas against continued incarceration. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115,
1120 (N.D. Ga. 1983). Shortly thereafter, all Cubans in the Leavenworth facility were
transferred to the federal penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia. Id. In June of that same
year, Rafael Fernandez-Roque, a Mariel Cuban detained at the Atlanta penitentiary,
filed a class action in federal court in Atlanta challenging the continued incarceration
of the Cubans. Id. The district court in Atlanta consolidated the two actions on June
14, 1981. Id.
On August 7, 1981, the district court certified the class action the Cubans detained
at the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary had filed. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 91 F.R.D.
117 (N.D. Ga. 1981). The court conditionally certified 12 subclasses distinguishing the
aliens on various grounds of excludability. Id. Three weeks later, in a post-hearing
order, the district court held that the INS had abused its discretion in continuing to
detain aliens who were unlikely to abscond or pose a threat to national security or the
public interest, who had not committed crimes in the United States, and who the Presi-
dent had invited to this country. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 91 F.R.D. 239 (N.D. Ga.
1981). Consequently, the court ordered the issuance of writs of habeas corpus to 155
Cuban detainees who met these criteria. Id. at 241.
In August 1981, the district court entered a temporary restraining order (TRO) en-
joining the government from deporting any of the detainees pending further order of
the court. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 671 F.2d 426, 428 (11 th Cir. 1982). The govern-
ment appealed the TRO, claiming it had become a preliminary injunction. Id. The
government also claimed that the district court lacked habeas corpus jurisdiction be-
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ity of the INS to detain aliens, many Mariel Cubans remain in deten-
cause the aliens had not exhausted the administrative appeals available under immigra-
tion law. Id. at 428-29. The circuit court concluded that the TRO was not appealable.
Id. at 428. The court remanded the case, ordering the district court to resolve the
jurisdictional issue in cases where the aliens had not exhausted their administrative
remedies. Id. at 431.
On remand, the district court held that it had habeas corpus jurisdiction and that the
aliens had valid claims under the United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 539 F. Supp. 925, 928-34 (N.D.
Ga. 1982). The court also found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review
final exclusion orders the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, that it lacked
jurisdiction to remand to INS for a hearing based on new evidence, and that the TRO
would continue pending appeal. Id. at 935-47.
The following year, detained Cubans who were approved for release challenged their
continued detention when the policy of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) re-
stricting the resettlement of these aliens in Florida delayed their release. Fernandez-
Roque v. Smith, 557 F. Supp. 690, 695-96 (N.D. Ga. 1982). The court held that the
Attorney General's policies restricting the resettlement of the Mariel detainees in Flor-
ida and restricting sponsorship by individual non-family members constituted unreason-
able abuse of discretion. Id. at 696. Accordingly, the court ordered that the government
cease adherence to the ORR policy restricting resettlement. Id.
In 1983, the detainees challenged the continued detention of Cubans who the govern-
ment determined were not releasable under the Status Review Plan. Fernandez-Roque
v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115 (N.D. Ga. 1983). The court held that the government had
statutory authority to detain indefinitely when it could not deport the aliens. Id. at
1124. The court, however, also found that after the initial period of detention of unde-
portable aliens, the INS is constitutionally required to justify subsequent detention on a
procedurally adequate finding of risk that the alien will abscond or pose a threat to
national security or the society. Id. at 1133. The court held that the Attorney General's
Status Review Plan did not afford adequate procedural hearings. Id. The court ordered
the government to file a plan for providing the Cubans with the hearings to which they
were entitled before the government legally could detain them. Id. at 1145-46.
On appeal, the circuit court consolidated the appeals of the government from the two
most recent district court decisions. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576 (1lth
Cir. 1984). The circuit court agreed with the district court that in cases where the INS
could not perpetuate the INA by immediately deporting excludable aliens, the govern-
ment had authority to detain indefinitely. Id. at 580. That court held, however, that
parole was part of the admissions process and that parole revocation did not rise to the
level of constitutional infringement. Id. at 582-84. The court further held that the At-
torney General did not abuse his discretion in deciding to refuse to authorize individual
non-family member sponsorship, or in restricting resettlement in Florida. Id.
That same year, the district court reversed the decision of the BIA in two asylum
test cases, stating that the BIA abused its discretion in denying requests to reopen the
cases. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 599 F. Supp. 1103, 1104 (N.D. Ga. 1984). The
court remanded the classwide asylum claims to the BIA for a hearing on the merits
and set aside final exclusion orders pending the outcome of the hearing. Id. at 1109-10.
In that same year, the district court denied the government motion to stay the order to
reopen the asylum cases pending appeal. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 599 F. Supp.
1110, 1111 (N.D. Ga. 1984).
In 1985, 147 Cubans approved for release under the Status Review Plan challenged
their continued incarceration when the government halted the release program after
the agreement with Cuba for their return. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 600 F. Supp.
1500 (N.D. Ga. 1985). The court held that the Attorney General abused his discretion
in refusing to release sponsored Cuban detainees approved for release. Id. at 1506.
The Eleventh Circuit issued a stay, refusing to delay further the deportation of cer-
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tion.87 The Cubans initiated the judicial challenge to their incarcera-
tion shortly after arriving in the United States.88 The number of
detained aliens, over 2,000, was so large that the detainees sought judi-
cial relief as a class.8"
The Cubans brought the first challenges to the detention in two ac-
tions. Moises Garcia-Mir brought an action for Cubans detained in
Leavenworth, Kansas and Rafael Fernandez-Roque represented the
group detained in Atlanta, Georgia.90 Upon consolidation of the cases,
the names of the parties were interchanged. The cases appear as both
tain class members. The Cubans then sought to set aside the stay. Garcia-Mir v.
Smith, 105 S. Ct. 948 (1985). The Supreme Court refused to modify further or set
aside the stay. Id. at 950.
The Eleventh Circuit then consolidated the appeals from the most current district
court decisions. Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478 (11 th Cir. 1985), cert. denied sub
nom. Marquez-Medina v. Meese, 106 S. Ct. 1213 (1986). The circuit court held that
the temporary suspension of releases was a proper exercise of the Attorney General's
authority in view of the agreement with Cuba. Therefore, the district court erred in
ordering the release of 34 detainees. Id. at 1485. The court also determined that the
district court lacked jurisdiction to act on the detainees' asylum claims when they had
not exhausted their administrative appeals. Id. at 1486.
Meanwhile, the Cubans sought relief from detention in district court under the the-
ory of a federally created liberty interest not arising under the Constitution. Fernan-
dez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Ga. 1985). The district court recognized
a protected liberty interest in parole for those aliens who were neither mental incompe-
tents nor serious offenders, who had come to this country in response to a presidential
invitation. Id. at 900. The court determined that mental incompetents and serious of-
fenders who the INS never paroled did not have the same liberty interest. Id. at 904.
Further, the court held that the Cubans failed to establish that customary international
law applied to their case. Id.
In the note case, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the appeal of the government from
the previous district court decision. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11 th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
87. See Boswell, supra note 63, at 929-30 & n.20 (discussing the difficulty in ascer-
taining the exact number of Cubans in detention centers). Many Cubans returned to
detention centers or halfway houses when sponsor relationships broke down. Id. at 930
n.20. This flow of detainees in and out of detention centers makes accurate counting of
detainees a difficult task. Id. The transfer of detainees from one facility to another also
inhibits accurate counting. Id.
Despite attempts to parole as many detained Cubans as the government considered
possible, as of 1982 approximately 1,800 aliens remained in detention. Fernandez-
Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115, 1120 (N.D. Ga. 1983). The most recent estimate
of detained Cubans at the Atlanta penitentiary exceeds 1,800 because authorities have
revoked, for varying offenses, paroles of many detainees. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith,
622 F. Supp. 887, 891 (N.D. Ga. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788
F.2d 1446 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289
(1986).
88. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (explaining the lengthy and complex
litigation of these cases).
89. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 91 F.R.D. 117 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
90. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 567 F. Supp. 1115, 1120 (N.D. Ga. 1983), rev'd,
734 F.2d 576 (11th Cir. 1984).
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Fernandez-Roque v. Smith and Garcia-Mir v. Smith.91
1. The Parties in Garcia-Mir v. Meese
The certified class of Mariel Cubans held in detention at the Atlanta
Federal Penitentiary brought the most recent challenge to INS deten-
tion authority.92 In Fernandez-Roque v. Smith,03 the district court di-
vided the alien class into two subclasses.04 The first subclass consisted
of Mariel Cubans who committed serious crimes in Cuba or who were
mentally incompetent.95 The second subclass consisted of Mariel
Cubans who obtained parole on arrival in the United States, but whose
parole the INS subsequently revoked.9 6
After disposing of the class action issue, the district court found that
detained Cubans who were neither mental incompetents nor convicted
criminals came to the United States pursuant to a presidential invita-
tion. 7 The district court held that this presidential invitation created a
protected liberty interest in parole.98 The court's recognition of this lib-
erty interest meant that the INS could detain an alien belonging to the
second subclass only if INS authorities found that the alien was likely
to abscond or to pose a serious threat to persons or property within the
United States.9 9 Consequently, the district court ordered parole revoca-
tion hearings for the second subclass of detained aliens."' 0 The govern-
91. See supra note 86 (explaining the history of these cases).
92. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1448 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
93. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Ga. 1985), rev'd sub nom.
Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ferrer-
Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
94. Id. at 893-95.
95. Id. at 893.
96. Id. at 895. The distinction between the subclasses is important. Although the
first group never acquired an interest in parole, the second group had an interest that
the government took away. See Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1452-53 (lth
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986) (quoting
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 422 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) (drawing a distinction
between deprivation of a possessed liberty and denial of a desired one)); see also infra
notes 166-72 and accompanying text (discussing actionable interests deriving from lib-
erties had and liberties desired).
97. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887, 896 (N.D. Ga. 1985). rev'd sub
nom. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ferrer-
Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
98.. Id.
99. Id. at 901; see 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a)(2) (1986) (permitting parole of aliens, pro-
vided they do not pose a security risk or a risk of absconding).
100. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887, 904 (N.D. Ga. 1985), rev'd sub
nom. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (1Ith Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ferrer-
Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
19871
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
ment immediately appealed this order. 10'
2. The District Court Decision in Garcia-Mir v. Meese
In an earlier challenge to their detention, the detained Mariel
Cubans claimed they possessed a constitutionally protected liberty in-
terest in parole arising directly from the Constitution.02 In rejecting
this claim, the court of appeals failed to address two other issues:
whether the aliens had a federally created liberty interest, and whether
international law protected the aliens. The district court decision, later
appealed in Garcia-Mir v. Meese, addressed these two issues.' 0 3
First, the district court considered whether the detained aliens had a
federally created liberty interest in parole, not arising from the Consti-
tution.'04 The district court recognized that a statute, regulation, rule,
practice, or policy could create a liberty interest. 0 5 The court stated
that apart from demonstrating a legitimate claim of entitlement, the
claimant must show that the official decision maker does not possess
unlimited discretion to grant or withhold a benefit.'0 Statutory lan-
guage that provides only procedural guidelines for conferring a benefit
does not create a constitutionally protected substantive interest.0 For
the interest to arise, governmental action must impose substantive limi-
tations on official discretion. 0 8 In reviewing the Attorney General's
Status Review Plan, 09 the court recognized that the Plan contained
limitations on official discretion." 0 Nevertheless, the court followed the
Eleventh Circuit determination that the Attorney General possesses
101. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Fer-
rer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
102. See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 582 (11th Cir. 1984) (rejecting
the aliens' claim to a constitutionally protected liberty interest).
103. See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887, 891 (N.D. Ga. 1985)
(reaching the previously unaddressed issues of a statutorily created right and protection
under international law), rev'd sub nom. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
104. Id. at 892.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 893.
108. Id. at 892.
109. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (describing the Status Review
Plan).
110. See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887, 894 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (stat-
ing that the Status Review Plan appears to place at least some substantive limitations
on official discretion, but failing to state what these limitations are), rev'd sub nom.
Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ferrer-
Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
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broad discretion over parole."1 Consequently, the district court con-
cluded that the Status Review Plan did not create the liberty interest
the aliens claimed because the agency has the discretion to dispense the
benefit. 12
The district court opinion differed from the court of appeals decision
on the issue of the presidential invitation." 3 The district court con-
cluded that through the invitation, the United States accorded the
Cubans a greater status than that conferred on other excludable
aliens."' Additionally, the court found that the presidential invitation
created an actionable liberty interest for the Cubans who had neither
committed serious crimes in Cuba nor were mentally incompetent."'
The government argued that a condition of the invitation was the re-
quirement that the United States admit the Cubans according to
United States immigration laws." 6 The court rejected this proposition,
stating that at the time the United States extended its invitation, it was
apparent that the Cubans would enter without proper
documentation."'
The court next inquired into what process was due the aliens. The
court concluded that although there was no constitutionally based lib-
erty interest in this case, the same due process standards must apply.'"8
To support this conclusion, the court relied on the Supreme Court's
finding that "the adequacy of statutory procedures for deprivation of a
statutorily created property interest must be analyzed in constitutional
terms."" 9
111. See Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478, 1484 (11th Cir. 1985) (making the
determination of broad discretionary powers in the Attorney General's parole author-
ity), cert. denied sub nom. Marquez-Medina v. Meese, 106 S. CL 1213 (1986).
112. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887, 894 (N.D. Ga. 1985), reV'd sub
nom. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ferrer-
Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
113. See id. at 896-900 (concluding that the presidential invitation created a lib-
erty interest). The President's statement provides in pertinent part: "we'll continue to
provide an open heart and open arms to refugees seeking freedom from Communist
domination and from economic deprivation, brought about primarily by Fidel Castro
and his government." Id. at 898 n.16.
114. Id. at 900.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 899.
117. See id. (noting that the invitation to "tens of thousands" of Cubans would
exceed the numerical quotas of immigration law). At the time of the President's
speech, 10,000 Cubans had already arrived in a matter of days. Id. at 897-98.
118. Id. at 901.
119. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (1974). The Court has reiterated the
holding that courts should apply constitutional analysis to the deprivation of statutorily
created property interests. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 US. 532,
541 (1985) (stating that the due process clause protects substantive rights that require
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After addressing the liberty interest claim, the court considered
whether international law accorded the Cuban aliens some protections
against detention. 120 The court noted that international law allows de-
tention when necessary for deportation, or the protection of society.' 2'
The court recognized, however, that this method of detention violates
customary international law when the government fails periodically to
review the need for continued detention. 22
In the case of the detained Cubans, however, a controlling executive
act precluded application of international law. 2 3 In ordering the con-
tinued detention of the aliens, the Attorney General acted pursuant to
his delegated authority. The aliens failed to show that the Attorney
General does not share the President's power to preempt customary in-
ternational law through an executive act directing the detention of
unadmitted aliens. 24 Under this analysis, relief from detention must
come from the President, the Attorney General, or Congress. 25
Accordingly, the district court directed the government to provide
parole hearings for the detained Cubans who neither committed serious
crimes in Cuba nor were mentally incompetent. 26 The government im-
mediately appealed the order. 27 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit in Garcia-Mir v. Meese confronted the legal issue of whether
excludable, unadmitted aliens have a right to a nonconstitutionally
based due process liberty interest that would entitle them to parole rev-
ocation hearings. 128
constitutionally adequate procedures for their deprivation); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.
480, 490-91 (1980) (noting that minimum due process requirements are a matter of
federal law and the fact that a state may have followed its own procedures for depriva-
tion of an interest may be inadequate).
120. See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887, 901-04 (N.D. Ga. 1985)
(claiming protection under the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees), rev'd sub nom. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
121. Id. at 903. An expert witness for the Cubans testified that international law
recognizes the need for detention in immigration cases and that arbitrary detention is
determined according to what is reasonable and fair under the circumstances. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. The court concluded that the Attorney General's order to continue the
detention of the aliens was a controlling executive act. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 903-04.
126. Id. at 904.
127. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Fer-




III. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISION IN GARCIA-MIR
V. MEESE
In Garcia-Mir v. Meese,129 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit addressed three claims the Mariel Cubans raised. First, the
court considered whether the aliens had a nonconstitutionally based
due process liberty interest entitling them to parole revocation hear-
ings. 3 Second, the court determined whether international law pro-
vided protection against indefinite detention. 131 Finally, the court raised
the issue of the validity of the class action. 32 The court concluded that
the class action issue was moot, finding that the aliens did not have an
actionable due process interest and that international law did not pro-
vide a source of relief.133 The court's failure to ground protection for
the aliens in due process or in international law exhausted all forms of
legal relief available.
A. THE LIBERTY INTEREST
The Eleventh Circuit identified two sources of due process protec-
tions necessary for an individual to claim a nonconstitutionally based
liberty interest.1 34 The first source is the due process clause of the fifth
amendment, which protects "core" values, such as the right to a fair
trial.1 3 5 The second source of due process protection stems from other
rights not based on the Constitution that although not "core" values,
are established sufficiently to constitute a deprivation of due process
when denied.1 36 The government cannot deny an individual the latter
rights without providing the process that relevant rules and regulations
require.
1 37
After identifying the sources of due process, the court distinguished
the due process rights of excludable aliens from those of domestic per-
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1449.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1455.
134. Id. at 1449.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1449-50 (noting that even state conferred rights involve due process
concerns). The court illustrated this principle by describing the "good-time credit" sys-
tem that a state may establish in its prisons. Id. The court concluded that in such
situations the state must apply fairly the rules that govern the system before depriving
a prisoner of such credits. Id. Even in cases where the Constitution does not compel
creation of the benefit, due process rights requirements attach. Id.
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sons.'318 Whereas domestic persons have full due process protections
under the fifth amendment, excludable aliens have virtually no consti-
tutional protections. 13 9 Following the holding in Mezei that excludable
aliens have only the due process rights the law chooses to provide, the
Eleventh Circuit avoided the issue of the due process rights of unadmit-
ted aliens. 40 In considering that the standards applicable in the domes-
tic context also apply to these aliens, the court found that the Cubans
failed to show the "existence of the particularized standards of review
that yield a protected liberty interest."''
After dispensing with the due process analysis, the court focused on
the INS regulations regarding parole. 42 The parole issue allowed the
court to determine whether the INS, in placing substantive limitations
on its own discretion, conferred a liberty interest on the detained
aliens. 4 3 The court affirmed the district court conclusion that the pa-
role regulations alone did not create a liberty interest.4 The court
found that the parole regulations placed fewer substantive limitations
on INS authorities than did the Status Review Plan.4
The Eleventh Circuit, however, disagreed with the district court de-
termination on the President's "invitation" to the Cubans to come to
the United States. 46 The court concluded that the invitation did not
constitute sufficient discretionary limitations on INS authorities to cre-
ate a valid interest in parole.' 47 The court rejected the argument that
the President's public statements alone created an actionable liberty
interest.14
8
138. Id. at 1450.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1450-51 (stating that it is prudent for a court to avoid resolving a dis-
pute on constitutional grounds when alternate grounds for resolution are available).
141. Id. at 1450.
142. Id. at 1451-53; see 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 (1986) (setting forth parole regulations).
143. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1451-53 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1451 (determining that the parole regulations were more restrictive
than the Status Review Plan).
146. See Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-422, § 501(e),
94 Stat. 1799, 1810 (1980) (codified at 8 U.S.C.A. § 1522 (West Supp. 1985)) (refer-
ring to these aliens as Cuban/Haitian entrants (Status Pending)).
147. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1451 (11th Cir.) (finding that the dis-
trict court determination regarding restrictions on executive discretion that the Presi-
dent's invitation imposed and the classification as status pending entrants was flawed),
cert. denied sub nom. Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct 289 (1986).
148. Id. at 1451. The President has publicly invited refugees to come to the United
States in the past. See Paktorovics v. Murft, 260 F.2d 610, 614 (2d Cir. 1958) (invit-
ing Hugarian refugees to come to the United States). Congress later enacted legislation
endorsing the President's actions. Id. at 614. The Eleventh Circuit noted that Congress
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The Eleventh Circuit relied on the analysis of the United States Su-
preme Court in Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 49 and
Olim v. Wakinekona150 to address the argument that the special parole
category of "Cuban/Haitian entrants (status pending)" conferred
greater liberty interests on the detained Cuban aliens than on other
excludable aliens. In Dumschat, the Supreme Court explained that a
constitutional entitlement does not arise because the state granted a
discretionary privilege in the past, but rather arises from the statutory
limitations imposed on state authorities."' Similarly, in Olim, the Su-
preme Court discerned a protected liberty interest arising from sub-
stantive statutory limitations on official discretion." 2
The circuit court applied the rationale of Dumschat and Olim to the
claims of the detained Cubans and concluded that the necessary sub-
stantive limitations on the discretionary parole powers of the INS did
had not taken the same steps toward the Mariel Cubans. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788
F.2d 1446, 1451 n.5 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nona. Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107
S. Ct. 289 (1986).
In Garcia-Mir v. Meese, the court noted that to determine that one of the political
branches alone can create or extinguish constitutional rights would undermine the es-
tablished system of checks and balances. Id. at 1451.
149. Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981). In Dumschat,
the respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder in 1964. Id. at 460.
Dumschat was eligible for parole in 1983, but the Connecticut Board of Pardons
(CBP), the body empowered to commute life sentences by reducing the prison term,
repeatedly denied Dumschat's applications for commutation of his sentence. Id. at 460-
61. Dumschat sought a declaratory judgment that the CBP violated his fourteenth
amendment due process rights in denying his applications without explanation. Id. The
Court held that the statute in this case created no entitlement because it merely gave
the CBP the power to commute sentences. Id. Moreover, the Court declared that a
state need not explain its reasons for a decision when the statute does not require it to
act on prescribed grounds. Id. at 465-67.
150. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983). In Olim, the respondent was serv-
ing concurrent sentences for murder, rape, robbery, and escape. Id. at 240. Prison offi-
cials classified Wakinekona as a maximum security risk. Id. The petitioners, a Program
Committee investigating disciplinary breakdowns within the maximum control unit in
the Hawaii State Prison, held a hearing at which they singled out Wakinekona as a
troublemaker. Id. On the petitioners' recommendation, authorities transferred Wakine-
kona to a prison on the mainland. Id. at 241. Wakinekona sued petitioners alleging that
they deprived him of due process because the same people that conducted the hearing
recommended his transfer. Id. at 243. The Court held that prison regulations in Hawaii
do not place substantive limitations on the prison administrator's discretion to transfer
an inmate. Id. at 249.
151. See Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465 (1981) (not-
ing that the statute or other rule must define the obligations of the authority).
152. See Olim v. Waldnekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983) (stating that when a deci-
sion maker operates without substantive limitations, a liberty interest is not created).
For example, when the decision maker can transfer a prisoner for any reason or no
reason at all, there are no limitations on his or her discretion that would create a lib-
erty interest for the prisoner. Id.
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not exist.153 The Cubans argued that their "special status" under the
Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980 (REAA)15 4 provided the
necessary limitations on INS discretion.155 The court ruled, however,
that the REAA special status related solely to social welfare benefits
and did not affect parole decisions.15 6 The court emphasized that immi-
gration authorities paroled the Cubans pursuant to the same parole
provision as other aliens,157 and therefore did not confer special
treatment. 58
Finally, in addressing the liberty interest of the Cubans whose parole
the INS revoked, the circuit court relied on the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Morrissey v. Brewer.59 In Morrissey, the Court held that the
fourteenth amendment protects a liberty interest in parole; therefore,
government authorities may not terminate parole without an orderly
process.1 60 The Mariel Cubans, however, could not persuade the Elev-
enth Circuit that the presumption of releasability argument the Su-
preme Court recognized in Morrissey was sufficient to constitute a lib-
erty interest for the aliens. Although the court found parallels between
the detained Cubans' case and Morrissey,""1 it distinguished the two
cases based on the nature of the liberty interests involved.16 2 The cir-
cuit court recognized that the liberty interest established in Morrissey
was constitutional, whereas the Cubans claimed a nonconstitutionally
153. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1452 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
154. Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980, § 501(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1522
(West Supp. 1985).
155. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1452 (1 lth Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
156. Id. The court equated the President's power to exercise authority over entrants
under the REAA to Chapter 2 of Title IV of the INA, which provides for social wel-
fare benefits. Id.; see Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980, § 501(a)(1), 8
U.S.C.A. § 1522 (West Supp. 1985) (providing welfare, medical, educational, and re-
settlement benefits).
157. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(d)(5) (1982) (delineating the general parole regulations).
158. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1452 (1 lth Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986). Further, the court noted that the
INS did not establish special regulations for these aliens. Id.
159. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). Morrissey was convicted of false
drawing of checks and sentenced to not more than seven years confinement. Id. at 472.
He was paroled the following year, but the Iowa Board of Parole revoked his parole
and returned him to prison because he violated the parole regulations. Id. at 472-73.
160. Id. at 482. The court concluded that the authority revoking parole must hold
an informal hearing to assure that it will base the finding of parole violations on facts
of the parolee's behavior. Id. at 484.
161. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (addressing parole revocation with
respect to citizens with full constitutional rights).
162. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1452 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
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based interest."' 3 The court based its decision on the Supreme Court
determination in Mezei that excludable aliens do not possess constitu-
tional protections.16 Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
Cubans did not possess the due process protections the Supreme Court
recognized in Morrissey.
65
The court further distinguished constitutional from nonconstitutional
liberty interests. 6 Relying on Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal In-
mates,16 7 the circuit court stressed the difference between a liberty had
and a liberty desired."8 A liberty had creates an actionable interest,
whereas a liberty desired does not.1 69 Following the logic of Green-
holtz, the court concluded that the Morrissey-type parole revocation
deprived the inmate of the liberty interest he had, while the Green-
holtz-type denial of parole was nonactionable because the inmate never
had a liberty interest.1 "' In Garcia-Mir, the Cubans claimed they had a
liberty interest existing independent of the parole authority, thereby
making it a constitutional interest.17 1 The court, however, found that
the parole authority did not create the interest at stake and, therefore,
the Cuban aliens did not possess the liberty interest claimed. 2
163. Id. at 1452-53.
164. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
165. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
166. Id.
167. Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979). In Greenholtz,
inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex brought a class action claim-
ing that the Board of Parole denied them procedural due process because the Board
refused to parole them. Id. at 3-4. The Supreme Court held that the state does not
create an entitlement to parole merely by providing for the possibility of parole. Id. at
9-11.
168. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (11th Cir), cert. denied sub nom.
Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986). While a nonconstitutional liberty
interest arises from the creation of rules that will bestow a benefit, a constitutional
liberty interest arises when one actually has one's liberty, and it is not dependent on
promulgated rules. Id.
169. Id. According to the holding in Greenholtz, a Morrissey-type parole revoca-
tion entails deprivation of a liberty had, whereas a Greenholtz-type parole release in-
volves denial of a liberty desired. Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 9
(1979).
170. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
171. See supra note 168 (stating that a constitutional interest does not depend on
promulgated rules).
172. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986). The INS never paroled Cubans in
the first subclass, therefore, the Cubans possessed only a Greenholtz-type liberty de-
sired interest. Id. Cubans in the second group had a Morrissey-type liberty interest
because the INS revoked their parole. Id. Because the Morrissey-type liberty interest is
constitutional, however, it did not apply to these unadmitted aliens. Id.
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The circuit court made three determinations on the liberty interest.
First, the due process clause does not protect the excludable Mariel
Cuban aliens. 173 Second, the rules and regulations did not limit sub-
stantively the discretionary powers of INS authorities so as to create a
liberty interest for the aliens. 74 Third, the aliens had no actionable
claim under the logic of Morrissey because the interest recognized in
that case was a constitutionally based interest.
17 5
B. THE INAPPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Cubans also challenged their detention as a violation of custom-
ary international law prohibiting prolonged arbitrary detention. 17  The
court recognized that customary international law is a part of the com-
mon law of the United States, and that domestic legislation should
avoid violations of international law.177 The court determined, however,
that international law overrides domestic law in a domestic forum only
in the absence of a controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision.' 7 8 The court found that the International Security and Devel-
opment Cooperation Act of 1980 (ISDCA)1 9 was a controlling enact-
ment that displaced the customary international law prohibition against
prolonged detention. 80
The court's interpretation of the ISDCA was the critical element in
the attempt to establish legislative intent to detain aliens indefinitely.
In Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, a previous decision of the same court,
the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit determined that the de-
173. See id. at 1449-51 (discussing the due process issue).
174. See id. at 1451-52 (failing to find a limitation on discretion).
175. See id. at 1452-53 (concluding that the holding in Morrissey did not apply).
176. Id. at 1453; see RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 702(e) comment h (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985) (stating in perti-
nent part, "[d]etention is arbitrary if it is supported only by a general warrant, or is
accompanied by notice of charges; if the person detained is not given the opportunity
early to communicate with family or to consult counsel; or is not brought to trial within
a reasonable time").
177. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (11th Cir.) (stating the common
law of the United States has incorporated the public law of nations), cert. denied sub
nom. Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
178. Id. The court relied on The Paquete Habana and the Restatement (Revised)
of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 131 comment d to support its conclu-
sion that domestic legislation or judicial decision may override international law. Id.
179. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-533, 94 Stat. 3131 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.) (author-
izing appropriations for the fiscal year 1981 for international security and development
assistance, the Peace Corps, refugee assistance, and for other purposes).
180. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1454 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied sub nora.
Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
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portation statute 81 did not restrict the Attorney General's power to de-
tain indefinitely.18 2 This lack of restriction was not sufficient to estab-
lish the affirmative intent of Congress to grant the Attorney General
the power to detain aliens. 83 The court in Garcia-Mir v. Meese, how-
ever, discerned sufficient congressional intent to justify continued de-
tention of the aliens.'84 The court interpreted language in the
ISDCA185 as support for the proposition that the Cuban aliens in the
first group should remain in continued detention until their deporta-
tion.18 6 In holding that this statute allows prolonged detention of the
aliens in the first subclass, the court found a controlling legislative en-
actment that superseded customary international law. 8
As for the second subclass of aliens who were incarcerated because
of parole revocations, the circuit court agreed with the district court
that the Department of Justice lacked the power to detain without a
hearing.i8 8 The court concluded that in the absence of a controlling
legislative act, the Attorney General's actions terminating the Status
Review Plan and revoking parole constituted controlling executive
acts.8 9 The Mariel Cubans argued that controlling executive acts must
originate with the President, and in this case the acts originated with
the Attorney General.19° In response, the court declined to interpret the
decision in The Paquete Habana'9 ' as prohibiting the President's cabi-
181. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a) (West Supp. 1985).
182. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 580 n.6 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
183. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453-54 (1 th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986); see Fernandez-Roque v. Smith,
622 F. Supp. 887, 902 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (noting that although the deportation statute
does not address indefinite detention, it does not restrict the Attorney General's discre-
tion to detain excludable aliens), rev'd sub non. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446
(11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
184. See Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1454 n.9 (11th Cir.) (citing the
ISDCA as congressional intent to detain), cert. denied sub nora. Ferrer-Mazorra v.
Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
185. Id. The ISDCA states that, "[t]he Congress urges the Executive branch, con-
sistent with United States law, to seek the deportation of such individuals." Id.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 1454 (citing the ISDCA as the controlling enactment that super-
sedes international law).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1454-55.
190. Id.
191. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); see Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788
F.2d 1446, 1454 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nona. Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S.
Ct. 289 (1986) (stating that the amicus brief in Garcia-Mir mischaracterizd the facts
that distinguished The Paquete Habana).
During the Spanish American War, the United States captured two Cuban fishing
vessels off the coast of Cuba, claimed them as prizes of war, and sold them. The Pa-
quete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 678-79 (1900). The Secretary of the Navy gave an admi-
ral permission to seize vessels likely to aid the enemy. Id. at 713. The Supreme Court
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net officers from taking controlling executive actions.192
The court also noted that the Cuban aliens mistakenly relied on the
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States because
subsequent drafts modified the Restatement to allow the President to
take actions violating international law when acting within his or her
constitutional authority. 193 The court asserted that under a recent ver-
sion of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, the President has
constitutional authority to delegate power to executive departments",
that may disregard international law if domestic needs so dictate.'
Consequently, the court of appeals recognized that the Attorney Gen-
eral's acts may supersede the dictates of international law. 9 6
Finally, relying on the decision in Jean v. Nelson,197 which extended
the holding in Mezei to indefinitely detained aliens, the court found
controlling judicial precedent preventing it from applying international
law.' 98 The court thereby avoided a decision that would restrain the
political branches in dealing with changing world conditions.199 As a
result of this decision, the detained Mariel Cubans have exhausted
their claims in the federal courts and face indefinite detention, barring
deportation proceedings or congressional action on their behalf.
V. EVALUATION OF THE LEGAL ISSUES
A. LEGALITY OF THE DETENTION
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit correctly concluded
that detaining excludable aliens is legal under the INA. 00 The INA
held that the seizures were unlawful because international law exempted fishing vessels
lawfully employed in their vocation from capture as prizes of war. Id. at 686.
192. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1454 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
193. Id. at 1454-55.
194. See U.S. CONsT. art. 2, § 2 (vesting the President with authority over the
officers of the executive departments). Under this section, the President may require
the opinion of executive officers on any subject relating to the duties of their offices. Id.
195. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1455 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
196. Id.
197. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 972 (lth Cir. 1984) (holding that even an
indefinitely detained alien could not challenge his detention without a hearing), afTd,
472 U.S. 846 (1985).
198. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1455 (lth Cir.) (noting that in The
Paquete Habana the United States Supreme Court applied a judicial ruling to interdict
the reach of international law), cert. denied sub nom. Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S.
Ct. 289 (1986).
199. Id. (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976)).
200. See generally Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 472 U.S.
846 (1985) (affirming the detention of excludable aliens).
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provides the legal basis for detaining both deportable and excludable
aliens.2 ' The INA, however, addresses the duration of detention only
with respect to deportable aliens. 2  Provisions regarding deportable
aliens are extensive, detailing the methods of arrest and custody, and in
particular, establishing a six month detention period once the final de-
portation order issues.203 The Attorney General must effect the depor-
tation of the alien within six months.10 If the INS has not deported the
alien within the six month period, the INS may release the alien sub-
ject to supervisory conditions. 0 5
In contrast to the six month detention specified for deportable aliens,
the INA does not address the appropriate duration of detention for ex-
cludable aliens not immediately deported. 20 6 The silence of the statute
on this issue is significant because it suggests that Congress did not
intend prolonged detention for excludable aliens.207 Although the INA
mentions the possibility that the country from which the alien arrived
may not be willing to accept his or her return, it presumes the possibil-
ity of deportation to another country. 20 8 The only mention of detaining
excludable aliens is that those responsible for bringing the aliens to the
United States must pay any detention expenses.20 9
The distinction concerning detention signifies the different degrees of
constitutional protection the United States affords deportable and ex-
cludable aliens. The deportable alien who has crossed the border and is
physically present in the United States receives protection against in-
fringement of rights.210 The excludable alien, however, has not yet initi-
ated an entry, despite his or her physical presence in the United
States.2 ' Therefore, the excludable alien has not acquired the same
201. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a), 1227(a) (1982).
202. Id. 1252.
203. Id.
204. Id. § 1252(c).
205. See id. § 1252(d) (stipulating the conditions of release pending deportation to
which the alien is subject).
206. See id. § 1227(a)(1) (providing only that the INS should deport an excludable
alien immediately).
207. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing the Attorney General's
power to grant aliens temporary harborage through parole).
208. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (1982) (presuming that the INS can deport the alien
to the country where he or she resides; was born; is a citizen, subject, or national; or if
the INS cannot deport the alien to any of the other countries, to any country willing to
accept him or her).
209. Id.
210. See generally Lopez & Lopez, supra note 55, at 745-54 (distinguishing be-
tween the rights of deportable aliens who have physically entered the United States and
excludable aliens at the border).
211. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 578 n.2 (1lth Cir. 1984).
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rights as the deportable alien. 2 This logic partially emanates from the
fact that because the excludable alien is usually still physically at the
border, the alien facilitates his or her return to the country from where
he or she came. Congress appears to have contemplated a short deten-
tion period that would allow authorities to arrange the immediate re-
turn of the alien. 13 If immediate deportation is not appropriate or pos-
sible, the INA allows the temporary admission of the excludable alien
through parole.214
The INA vests the Attorney General with the discretionary authority
to parole excludable aliens for emergent reasons or for reasons in the
public interest.2 15 Because the INS does not regard this type of admis-
sion as an entry,216 Congress may have perceived the presence of the
excludable alien as temporary. Because Congress allowed physical pres-
ence without conferring the usual protections associated with that pres-
ence, Congress may not have expected the paroled alien to be present
for an extended period of time.2
A problem of prolonged detention arises from the uncertainty in the
length of detention of undeportable aliens. This problem occurs when
the INS cannot return the alien to the country from where he or she
came, and no other country will accept the alien. If detention is for the
purpose of ensuring deportation 218 and the INS cannot effect deporta-
tion,219 parole usually resolves this problem. 2 0 Nevertheless, the prob-
lem is more complex when immigration officials do not release the de-
tained aliens because it is believed that the aliens may pose a
dangerous threat to the public or themselves .2 2 The circuit court in
Garcia-Mir v. Meese confronted this dilemma and decided in favor of
212. Lopez & Lopez, supra note 55, at 745-54.
213. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1) (1982) (requiring immediate deportation).
214. Id. § 1181(d)(5).
215. Id. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
216. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (noting that parole did not confer
legal admission).
217. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1982).
218. See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887, 903 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (rec-
ognizing the validity of detention pending deportation under international law), revd
sub nom. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Fer-
rer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
219. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (reporting that Cuba refused to
accept the return of the aliens).
220. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 190 (1957) (stating that "parole
of aliens seeking admission is simply a device through which needless confinement is
avoided while administrative proceedings are conducted"). Consequently, "detention
has been the exception not the rule." Id.
221. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (stating that the INS may detain




detention while the government secures the return of the aliens to
Cuba.222
B. AFFIRMATIVE LEGISLATIVE GRANT OF AUTHORITY THAT
SUPERSEDES THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
The INA itself does not address the Attorney General's power to
detain an alien indefinitely. The decision in Garcia-Mir v. Meese stops
short of suggesting that the lack of restriction on the Attorney General
to detain indefinitely is a sufficient grant of power that supersedes in-
ternational law.223 Instead, the court sought an affirmative legislative
grant of authority to justify the Attorney General's power.22' The court
relied heavily on what it perceived as congressional intent to grant the
executive branch the power to detain indefinitely, thereby overriding
the provisions of customary international law.225 The ISDCA, on which
the court relied to justify the power to detain aliens, 20 instructs the
executive to "seek the deportation of such individuals." 227 The court
emphasized that the language of the enactment requires the executive
to comply with United States law, and that United States law incorpo-
rates international law. 2 8
The court, however, overlooked an important point. The language of
the ISDCA calls for the deportation, not detention, of aliens.229 The
ISDCA urges the executive branch to take action to effect the return of
the Cubans, through negotiations with the Cuban government or
through some other method the executive deems appropriate.20 Seek-
ing deportation, however, has little to do with an affirmative legislative
grant to detain. The court reads the language of the ISDCA as con-
gressional intent to continue detention of the Cubans until deporta-
222. See Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1455 (11th Cir.) (concluding that
the Cuban aliens will remain in detention unless Congress or the executive branch
takes some action on their behalf), cert. denied sub non. Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese,
107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
223. See id. at 1453-54 (finding no restriction in the statute on the Attorney Gen-
eral's power to detain).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1454.
226. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (citing the language of the
enactment).
227. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1454 n.9 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
228. Id.
229. See International Service and Development Cooperation Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-533, § 716, 94 Stat. 3131, 3162 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 22
U.S.C.) (calling for the deportation of the detained Cuban aliens).
230. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text (discussing the provisions of
the ISDCA regarding these Cubans).
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tion.231 This language, however, may also imply that Congress recog-
nized the urgent necessity to release the Mariel Cubans from indefinite
detention and to procure their return to Cuba.23 2
The INA does not give the Attorney General an affirmative grant to
detain excludable aliens indefinitely. Nevertheless, the circuit court in
Garcia-Mir v. Meese did not hesitate to find congressional intent to
detain the Mariel Cubans in a statute that requests their deporta-
tion.2 3 A different interpretation of that same statute supports the view
that Congress recognized the inequity in indefinite detention. In finding
congressional intent to grant the Attorney General the power to detain,
the courts again avoided an important constitutional question.
C. AVOIDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
Immigration law accords deportable and excludable aliens a lesser
degree of constitutional protection than that accorded resident aliens or
United States citizens.234 Nevertheless, since the United States Su-
preme Court decision in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,3 5 courts have recognized
that aliens are persons under the Constitution, and are entitled to equal
protection under law when present in United States territorial jurisdic-
tion.236 While most of the case law in this area focuses on equal protec-
tion, the analysis applies equally to the due process rights of aliens pre-
sent within United States territory.237 In contrast, United States
231. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1454 n.9 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
232. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text (urging deportation, not de-
tention, in the ISDCA).
233. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1454 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
234. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 578 n.2 (I th Cir. 1984); see Rod-
riguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 790 (D. Kan. 1980) (stating that
excludable aliens do not enjoy the same constitutional rights guaranteed to citizens and
aliens who have entered the United States), a.ff'd on other grounds, 654 F.2d 1382
(10th Cir. 1981).
235. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
236. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210-30 (1982) (holding that children of
illegal aliens are entitled to equal protection under the fourteenth amendment); Ma-
thews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77-87 (1976) (extending fifth amendment protection
against discrimination to illegal aliens); Graham v.. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 370-83
(1971) (holding that the fourteenth amendment prevents states from withholding wel-
fare benefits from alien beneficiaries); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238
(1896) (emphasizing that the fourteenth amendment protects individuals within the
territorial boundaries of the states, including illegal aliens); see also Note, Plyler v.
Doe: Expanding the Application of the Equal Protection Clause to Illegal Aliens, 10
OHIO N.U.L. REV. 563, 564 (1983) (discussing the Supreme Court decision in Plyler
that extended equal protection to children of illegal aliens).




immigration law denies the same due process status to excludable
aliens, although these aliens may be physically present within United
States jurisdiction as well.23a
Consequently, while there is support for the extension of constitu-
tional rights to aliens, there is also precedent that denies excludable
aliens the same rights.239 In Jean v. Nelson2' 0 the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit held that excludable aliens have no constitutional
rights with regard to admission, asylum, or parole. The Supreme Court,
however, affirming on other grounds, specifically stated that the court
of appeals should not have reached the constitutional question.2" Ac-
cordingly, in Garcia-Mir v. Meese, the Eleventh Circuit avoided the
constitutional question.
The extent of constitutional protections accorded excludable aliens
thus remains a viable issue. Because excludable aliens may find them-
selves in inequitable circumstances, courts must determine the scope of
their constitutional protection. Until the courts answer the question of
how much due process protection excludable aliens within United
States territory possess, government authorities can continue to hold
these aliens in prolonged detention.
D. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GARCIA-MIR V. MEESE
The Eleventh Circuit decision in Garcia-Mir v. Meese is significant
for two reasons. First, the decision represents a reaffirmation of the old
approach in immigration law, namely, that excludable aliens possess no
due process rights under the United States Constitution. Second, the
decision exemplifies the failure of present immigration law and policy
to provide an adequate solution to the problem.
First, in following the decisions in Mezei and Jean v. Nelson, the
238. See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 578 n.2 (11 th Cir. 1984) (dis-
cussing the "entry fiction").
239. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 27-28 (1982) (finding that aliens
have no constitutional rights to be admitted to the United States); Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 207-16 (1953) (holding that the continued
detention of an undeportable alien did not violate any statutory or constitutional
rights); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950) (find-
ing that the Attorney General, acting pursuant to his or her parole authority, may
exclude an alien without a hearing; cf. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 967-69 (11 th Cir.
1984) (holding that excludable aliens have no constitutional rights entitling them to
admission, asylum, or parole), afid, 472 U.S. 846 (1985). See generally Henkin, The
Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad and at Our
Gates, 27 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 11 (1985) (discussing the rights of aliens under the
Constitution and the constitutional principles governing immigration and deportation).
240. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984), arid, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
241. Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854 (1985).
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decision in Garcia-Mir v. Meese reaffirms the Attorney General's
power to detain excludable aliens, even when the detention is indefi-
nite.24 2 The decision also supports the proposition that excludable aliens
may not challenge their detention under a nonconstitutionally based
right.,4 3 In this respect, the decision goes beyond the questionable out-
come in Jean v. Nelson that excludable aliens have no constitutional
rights with respect to admission, asylum, or parole. 44 The decision in
Garcia-Mir hinders possible protection for excludable aliens.
Although the detention in Garcia-Mir and in Mezei were substan-
tially different, 45 the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed the current validity
of the detention recognized in Mezei.24 The decision in Garcia-Mir,
however, goes farther than Mezei. Rather than limiting detention of
excludable aliens to border detention, the result in Garcia-Mir also per-
mits incarceration inside the United States.
Second, the decision in Garcia-Mir demonstrates a failure of the sta-
tus quo in immigration law. When an inequitable situation results from
the absence of a provision in the law, Congress or the courts should
clarify the law. Two different circuit courts addressing the dilemma of
the Mariel Cubans reached opposing conclusions. These opposing con-
clusions exemplify an inequitable situation that the courts or Congress
must ameliorate.24 7
In Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held that the INA does not permit indefinite detention as
an alternative to exclusion.2 48 Accordingly, after a reasonable time240
242. See Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1455 (1 1th Cir.), (relying on the
Court decision in Jean v. Nelson interpreting Mezei to conclude that the power to
detain extends to an indefinite period of time), cert. denied sub nom. Ferrer-Mazorra v.
Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
243. Id. at 1452-53.
244. Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 984 (lth Cir. 1984), afJd, 472 U.S. 846
(1985).
245. Compare Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953)
(detaining aliens on Ellis Island, literally at the border) with Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788
F.2d 1446 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct, 289
(1986) (detaining aliens at a maximum security prison within United States territorial
jurisdiction).
246. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1455 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Ferrer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
247. Compare Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981)
(concluding that the INA does not allow prolonged and indefinite detention and order-
ing the excludable aliens' release) with Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100 (4th Cir.
1982) (concluding that Congress implicitly authorized the Attorney General to order
the indefinite detention of excludable aliens).
248. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1389 (10th Cir. 1981). A
Mariel Cuban detained in the federal penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas, not a mem-
ber of the Garcia-Mir class, brought habeas corpus proceedings for his release. Id. at
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during which the INS negotiates the aliens' return, if the INS does not
deport the aliens, they must release them.2 °0 Otherwise, detention
would become impermissible punishment, not detention pending depor-
tation.251 Conversely, in Palma v. Verdeyen, the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit concluded that Congress, through the INA, implic-
itly authorized the Attorney General to detain excludable aliens indefi-
nitely if the INS cannot return them successfully. 252 The different con-
clusions of these two circuits demonstrates that the INA is open to
contrary interpretations concerning the duration of an excludable
alien's detention. Until the United States Supreme Court addresses the
question, or until new legislation limits the duration of detention for
excludable aliens,253 lower courts will continue to interpret the Act's
silence on the duration of detention in different ways. In the meantime,
a number of Mariel Cuban aliens suffer from lengthy detentions.2 '
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Courts currently construe the INA in several different ways. Either
Congress, the executive branch, or the courts must find solutions to
ameliorate the treatment accorded the Mariel Cubans. This Note sug-
gests several possible remedies for the situation.
First, the most obvious solution, and the one Congress consistently
calls for, is the deportation of the detained Cubans."5 The United
States can accomplish this through pressing enforcement of the Decem-
ber 14, 1984 agreement with Cuba, or negotiating a new agreement.
Considering the present stalemate in the negotiations for the return of
the aliens, however, the United States government should address other
options.
1384.
249. Id. at 1389-90. The Court failed to elaborate on what is a reasonable length of
time for the detention. Id. The INS detained the alien in Rodriguez-Fernandez for over
one year. Id. at 1384-85.
250. Id. at 1384-85.
251. See id. at 1387 (discussing the nature of this group of aliens' detention).
252. Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1982).
253. See H.R. 3810, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 132 CONG. REC. 9801-26
(1986) (proposing to amend the INA, but failing to specify duration of an excludable
alien's detention). The bill, however, specifically calls for the deportation of the Cuban
aliens. Id.
254. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (1 1th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Fer-
rer-Mazorra v. Meese, 107 S. Ct. 289 (1986).
255. See International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-533, § 716, 94 Stat. 3131, 3162 (1980) (codified at scattered sections of 22
U.S.C.) (calling for the deportation of the Cubans); see also H.R. 3810, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess., reprinted in 132 CONG. REC. 9801-26 (1986) (same).
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A second possibility, although not a solution for all the detained
Cubans, is to reimplement the Attorney General's Status Review
Plan.2 56 The Plan would allow a case-by-case review of the detainees'
files. The INS may find that it can release aliens who do not pose a risk
to society.
Third, if the administration holds the Cubans in preventive detention
indefinitely, Congress should consider an adjustment of their status.
Through a legislative enactment, Congress can grant these aliens mini-
mal due process rights. This change would put the Cubans on equal
footing with people held in civil internment.
Finally, Congressional reconsideration of the deportable and excluda-
ble distinction may clarify immigration law and guide legislatures,
courts, and administrators in the future. It is time for immigration law
to stop hiding behind the "entry fiction" and squarely address the issue
of detained excludable aliens. Alternatively, Congress should amend
the INA to incorporate a limitation on the duration of detention of
excludable aliens. The latter suggestions may make many Mariel
Cubans eligible for release on parole. Any of these solutions would give
detained Cubans and future detained aliens some relief from indefinite
incarceration.
CONCLUSION
Over the six year history of legal challenges to detention, the courts
have stated that excludable Mariel Cubans have no rights under the
United States Constitution,257 nor statutorily based rights, 258 nor pro-
tection against prolonged detention under international law.215 Addi-
tionally, the Mariel Cubans have now exhausted their legal remedies in
federal court. The result of the Eleventh Circuit decision in Garcia-Mir
v. Meese is a reaffirmation of indefinite detention recognized in
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, how-
ever, extends that detention to excludable aliens inside United States
territory.
The courts are not solely responsible for the continued detention of
the Mariel Cubans. The executive branch set the policy incarcerating
this group of aliens, some for as long as seven years. In the hope that
the INS will be able to deport these individuals to Cuba, the legislature
256. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (describing the Status Review
Plan).
257. Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576 (11th Cir. 1984).
258. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Fer-




is also unwilling to take affirmative steps to resolve the problem of the
indefinite detention aliens face.
Until the courts accept the challenge of clearly delineating the rights
of excludable aliens inside the United Stites, undeportable excludable
aliens may, at the discretion of the INS, continue to face indefinite
incarceration. Until Congress amends the provisions of the INA to in-
corporate a limitation on the duration of the detention of excludable
aliens, Mariel Cubans will remain in detention awaiting deportation.
Additionally, federal courts will continue to interpret the statute
inconsistently.
The Eleventh Circuit decision in Garcia-Mir v. Meese reaffirms the
view that the government need not recognize the rights of excludable
aliens. In addition, the government may detain these aliens as long as
necessary to effect deportation. Consequently, the courts and the immi-
gration laws have reduced the Mariel Cubans to the status of inmates
without rights.
POSTSCRIPT
In a discretionary decision in November 1986, the INS decided to
release all but 275 to 300 detained Cubans."' As of November 1987,
there were approximately 3,800 Mariel Cubans in detention centers
around the country.2"1 On November 20, 1987, the State Department
announced that Cuba had agreed to restore the 1984 agreement for the
return of 2,746 Mariel Cubans." 2 As part of the agreement, the United
States will accept up to 20,000 Cuban immigrants per year.
After the announcement of the United States/Cuba agreement,
Mariel Cubans, detained at the Oakdale, Louisiana federal detention
center protested their deportation. The protests escalated until the
aliens rioted and took control of the center, holding hostages to ensure
that the United States government met their demands.26 3 The following
day, the Mariel Cubans detained in Atlanta rioted and took control of
260. See Sinclair, Cubans Here May Be Paroled, Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1986, at
A16, col. 1 (reporting that the INS considered releasing the aliens). The expense in-
curred to maintain 1,800 detainees prompted the INS decision. Id. The cost to the
government to house and feed these individuals is approximately $65 per day. Id.
261. What Happened to the Marielitos?, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1987, at B6, col. 1.
262. Lewis, U.S. and Havana Agree to Restore Immigration Pact, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 21, 1987, at 1, col. 1; Goshke, U.S. and Cuba to Reactivate Migration Pact,
Wash. Post, Nov. 21, 1987, at Al, col. 6.
263. Smothers, Cuban Inmates Facing Expulsion. Take Over a Center in Louisi-
ana, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1987, at 1, col. 3; Maraniss, Cuba Exiles Holding 20 as
Hostages, Wash. Post, Nov. 23, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
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the federal penitentiary.264 In an effort to end the uprisings and release
the hostages, Attorney General Edwin Meese III offered to declare a
moratorium on deporting the detained Cubans. 2 5 The Attorney Gen-
eral offered full, fair, and equitable review of the detainees' files before
deportation.26 6 One week after the prison siege began in Louisiana, the
inmates agreed to release their hostages and turn themselves over to
prison authorities. 6 7 Similarly, five days later, the inmates at the At-
lanta penitentiary released their hostages and ended the prison
takeover.268
After seven years, the end of detention may be in sight for the
Mariel Cubans. Once again, an unexpected, unique situation has
brought the immigration laws concerning exclusion under public scru-
tiny. Perhaps, as a result of the attention the Mariel Cubans have at-
tracted, Congress will address the problems of the immigration laws
concerning exclusion.
264. Harris, Meese Offers to Delay Cuban Deportations, Rioting Spreads to At-
lanta Penitentiary, Wash. Post, Nov. 24, 1987, at Al, col. 5.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Rezendas, Siege Ends At Prison In Louisiana, Wash. Post, Nov. 30, 1987, at
Al, col. 1.
268. Smothers, Cubans With 89 Hostages Agree to End Atlanta Prison Takeover,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1987, at Al, col. 2; Phillips and Thompson, Officials, Inmates
Agree to End Prison Siege, Wash. Post, Dec. 4, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
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